

Lecture 7 (AO but mostly JK, April 9)

Environmental Policy in the Central European Context

Time: Thursdays 3 p.m. – 6 p.m.

Location: at CERGE-EI, Room # 7

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WEEK: TOPICS: DATE: INSTRUCTOR

1 Introduction (history/outline) Feb 19 JK/AO

2 Market failures: externalities, tragedy of the commons, enforcement as public good, also, (rise and fall) of the environmental Kuznets Curve February 26 AO

3 Interventionalist solutions to the Externality problem – Pigouvian taxes and standards and charges, also environmental labeling and incomplete consumer information in laboratory markets March 5 JK

4 Interventionalist solutions to the Externality problem – Marketable pollution permits March 12 AO

5 Non-Interventionalist solutions to the Externality problem – The Coasian solution March 19 JK

6 Non-interventionalist solutions to the Externality problem – Self-regulation March 26 AO

7 *Mid-term exam April 2*

8 **Environmental Policy in the Czech Republic – History and current issues April 9 JK**

9 Environmental Policy in the EU – History and current problems April 23 (April 16 falls into Semester break and on Easter Holiday) AO

10 Environmental Policy in the world context – History and Current problems April 30 JK/AO

11 Contingent valuation and related issues May 7 AO

12 **To be determined by the interests of the class**

Final exam: to be determined (according to schedule May 18 – 21)

The Greens, Czech Politics, and the Current Political Situation

References:

Stephen Deets & Karel Kouba (2008), The Czech Greens revived. *Environmental Politics*, 17.5, 815 – 821

Various recent articles from Radio Prague, Prague Post, and Ceske noviny

The Current Political Situation: A Mess (a government gridlock)

March 24, 2009: Apparently to everyone's surprise [including Paroubek], the centre-right government goes down after (yet another, the fifth, this time successful) vote of no confidence (101 votes against, of which 97 votes came from Social Democrats and Communists, and four of "independents" that were formerly members of Civic Democrats and Greens)

- after two years and two months of government
- in the middle of a worsening economic crisis, essentially coming from the real sector in Germany rather than the financial sector here, with
 - o January's industrial output down by 23.3 percent year-on-year, capping a fourth straight monthly drop
 - o January's orders down by 26.6 percent year-on-year
- in the middle of being at the helm of the EU (with the Lisbon Treaty still to be ratified)
 - o The Czech Republic remains the only member state that has yet to finish voting on the unifying EU document. (Although it passed through the lower house in February, its fate in the Senate, home to several Euroskeptic ODS members, remains unclear.)
 - o The chief Euroskeptic, President Václav Klaus, now has significant influence over EU presidency due to Topolánek's lame-duck status (and his right to appoint a new government). Not an enticing thought given that an important EU summit is scheduled for June during which it was to be discussed how to complete the ratification of the Lisbon treaty.

March 27, 2009: Czech Prime Minister Topolanek

- formally submits his resignation to President Klaus
- is not, contrary to expectations, asked to remain in office until the end of the country's EU presidency

March 27, 2009: Czech President Klaus

- makes it clear that he will use his constitutional right to appoint whoever he wants as prime minister designate
- formulates condition: appointment will go to the person that can provide guarantee that has majority – 101 votes - in lower house (mission impossible?)

April 4, 2009: News that interim (“caretaker”) government supported by the three parties on which the government drew (Civic Democrats [Topolanek, until last year also Klaus], Christian Democrats, Greens [Bursak]) and the Social Democrats [Paroubek] who initiated the vote of no confidence (but without participation of the communists), under interim prime minister Jan Fischer (currently head of the Czech Statistical Office), possibly as “government of experts” [which is not likely to win approval by the lower house but could be in power until new elections], that should take over by second week of May until early elections to be held on October 9 and 10. Strategic constraints:

- o grand coalition (which could solve the problem) of Civic Democrats and Social Democrats would have enough votes to shorten electoral term and call early elections but ...
- o they would stand to lose votes in the elections to smaller parties (Christian Democrats, Greens [current polls predict they will not be in parliament come Fall, laying the blame where it belongs], etc.)

April 7, 2009: Christian Democrats voted not to nominate their ministers to such a government

April 9, 2009 (today noon, www.radio.cz):

President Klaus to appoint Jan Fischer prime minister

Czech President Václav Klaus will appoint Jan Fischer the country's new prime minister on Thursday. The news came shortly after the centre-right Civic Democrats and the opposition Social Democrats reaffirmed their support for a caretaker government led by non-partisan Jan Fischer. Under the deal, the new interim administration should have 16 non-partisan cabinet members, take over on May 9th and rule the country until early elections in October.

Although the two smaller coalition parties have reservations regarding this solution to the crisis, the two strongest parties on the Czech political scene – the Civic and Social Democrats have enough votes to push through both a confidence vote in the Fischer government and early elections.

New cabinet causes serious rift in Christian Democratic Party

The deal on a caretaker government has led to a serious rift within the Christian Democrats of the outgoing coalition. The party leadership ruled on Wednesday that it would not support the emerging Fischer cabinet, a decision that caused a public rift. At least five deputies, including Finance Minister Miroslav Kalousek on Wednesday pledged to support the caretaker administration, despite a threat from the party leader that if they broke with the party line they would not be allowed to run for the party in the European and parliamentary elections.

Kalousek considering leaving politics

Czech Finance Minister Miroslav Kalousek is considering leaving the Christian Democratic Party. Mr. Kalousek said in an online discussion on the Czech EU presidency website that he was seriously considering ending his political career and not running in the autumn parliamentary elections. He said he would make the decision on the basis of the outcome of the party's national conference in May. Mr. Kalousek, who has engaged in numerous public disputes with party leader Jiří Čunek, said he had given the matter serious consideration

How did this mess come about?

- Two former ODS [Civic Democrats] members, now independent MPs, (reportedly close to Klaus) voted with Social Democrats (and the Communists)
- Two former Greens members, now independent MPs, voted with Social Democrats and (and the Communists)

Consequences (quotations from April 2, 2009 article titled "Gov't gridlock harms presidency. Czech EU role suffers as politicians deal with collapse" by Markéta Hulpachová, Staff Writer

The current gridlock is no shock for local policymakers, who have since the country's 1993 formation witnessed four such scenarios. For the Czech EU presidency, however, the debacle portends a substantial loss of political clout.

"The Czech presidency has ended with the government collapse," said political analyst Jiří Pehe. "[Prime Minister Mirek] Topolánek, or whoever, will be allowed to finish the presidency and carry out all the administrative duties it commands, but the political initiative will move elsewhere."

After a wobbly start, the Czechs had just grown accustomed to their role at the helm of the EU, successfully maneuvering between the often clashing viewpoints of Germany, France and the United Kingdom while weaving a European solution to the economic crisis, Pehe said. "The collapse was a cold shower for them."

While countries like Italy are famous for presiding over the EU while weathering internal political crises, the Czech situation is singular due to the country's new-member status and the difficulty of the tasks it faces, Pehe said. "As a post-Soviet state, we were under scrutiny. Older member states doubted that such a small, inexperienced country could govern the EU when it couldn't govern itself. In a sense, these arguments now got confirmed."

<snip>

"It doesn't help," said Julia DeClerck-Sachsse from the Centre for European Policy Studies, a Brussels-based think tank. "In these times of crisis, it is another factor that adds to a general sense of insecurity."

<snip>

In the absence of a clear directive from the ČSSD, Klaus has also emerged as the only potential winner of the government collapse, to which he purportedly contributed. The Constitution gives the president power to appoint whomever he pleases to lead an interim government through the summer recess to snap elections, planned for early fall.

Traditionally, that appointment goes to the leader of the strongest political party. But, since neither Topolánek nor Paroubek could secure enough support on his own, their parties would have to forge an agreement to ensure the required confidence vote in Parliament.

As of press time, negotiations between these longtime rivals were inconclusive. <snip>

Unless the two reach an agreement, Klaus may appoint a technocratic government comprising apolitical experts of his choosing. Although it is doubtful that such a government would win parliamentary approval, a constitutional loophole would still allow it to remain in effect until the fall elections.

The situation is further complicated by the precarious relationship between former party mates Klaus and Topolánek, said political analyst Bohumil Doležal. Klaus resents Topolánek for leading the ODS - the party Klaus founded but left in December - away from its original principles. Topolánek, meanwhile, sees the no-confidence vote as an act of revenge on Klaus' part.

By pressuring the ODS and the ČSSD to reach an agreement as fast as possible, "Klaus is ruthlessly going after Topolánek's neck," Doležal said. "He wants to have the ODS all to himself again."

Former President Václav Havel likened the situation to a soap opera. "What bothers me most is that it deepens the alienation between politicians and society," he commented. "With all these attacks and muckraking, it is no longer about serving the public good."

Top four key Lisbon arguments

Debate on the treaty centers on a few general issues

By [Benjamin Thomas Cunningham](#) , bcunningham@praguepost.com
Staff Writer, *The Prague Post*, December 17th, 2008 issue

The EU Commission

Issue: The Lisbon Treaty proposes to reduce the number of commissioners by one-third, thus breaking from the policy of every state having a member on the commission at all times.

Pro: Although each member state currently has its own commissioner, the duty of commissioners is not to act as representatives of their home country but of the EU as a whole. Since commissioners are not representing the interests of individual states even now, the reduction will only make the commission more effective and efficient.

Con: Small states in particular have raised objections to this change. They argue that by not having a representative at all times, they lose a voice that they now share equally with larger states. Such concerns are furthered by a fear that other new offices created by the Lisbon Treaty (including the president of the European Council) will be more likely to go to politicians from larger or more established EU countries.

More consolidated foreign policy

Issue: The treaty seeks to merge the post of the European commissioner for external relations and European neighborhood policy and the post of the high representative for the common foreign and security policy into a single position, the high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy.

Pro: A more united Europe with a cohesive foreign policy is capable of being a major actor in world affairs on par with China, Russia and the United States. Without some consolidation and a single representative to oversee foreign affairs, the EU will continue to be a fractured voice on the world stage.

Con: Some states continue to be wary of tying their foreign policy to other member states. For example, some worry about having closely related foreign policies to the Baltic States, because of their proximity to and acrimonious relationship with Russia. Ireland, for example, is traditionally neutral, and anti-Lisbon campaigners argued that this would violate Irish neutrality in foreign affairs.

President of the European Council

Issue: Among the other Lisbon Treaty proposals is the creation of a permanent president of the European Council, a single individual to be elected for a two and a half year term, replacing the present six-month rotating presidency.

Pro: The new office will bring more consistency to the presidency post, enabling priorities and projects to move smoothly for longer than six months at a time. At present, the powers of the EU presidency (the head of government for the country holding the position for six months) are loosely defined. The new post is meant to solidify the duties of the president and, again, give the EU a more consolidated voice on the world stage.

Con: The primary argument again relates to a loss of national sovereignty by appointing a single person as head of the European Council and that power will be centralized in Brussels. Also, smaller states tend to fear that politicians from larger states are more likely to obtain this post, further overpowering their voice in EU affairs.

Democracy

Issue: Voters in the Netherlands and France rejected the EU constitution (the precursor to the Lisbon Treaty) in referendum in 2005. The Lisbon Treaty requires unanimous support from all member states, which it lacks in Ireland, where it was rejected by voters, the only citizens to vote on the Lisbon Treaty. A second vote in Ireland, now slated for late 2009, is a rejection of the democratic process.

Pro: The Irish “no” vote was based largely on misinformation and domestic political turmoil, including the resignation of Prime Minister Bertie Ahern amid corruption allegations. Public opinion polls show that most Irish do support the treaty. It will be impossible for the EU to operate effectively on the international stage without further streamlining its processes. The treaty is complex and hard to explain to voters. Democratically elected leaders are elected to make decisions on behalf of constituents.

Con: The Lisbon Treaty is merely a redrafting of the rejected constitution, and its ratification process (largely via national parliaments) is designed to bypass voters. Europeans don't want further consolidation. Each time voters are asked to decide, they oppose reforms that would further integrate member states. A call for a second vote in Ireland is proof that politicians are not listening to democratic voices in Europe.

How did this mess come about, part II:

Stephen Deets & Karel Kouba (2008), The Czech Greens revived. *Environmental Politics*, 17.5, 815 – 821

The aggregate actors:

Civic Democratic Party (ODS), centre-right, essentially a conservative party, “Republicans” in US terms

Christian Democratic Party (KDU), centre-right, essentially a conservative party with some religious orientation (whatever that means in the Czech Republic), “Republicans” in US terms

Czech Party of Social Democracy (CSSD), centre-left, “Democrats” in US terms

Communists (KSCM), left party, essentially the old state party, unreformed

Czech Greens (SZ)

- founded in 1989
- success in 1990 elections (motivated by environmental degradation under communism, notably the tremendous air pollution in northern Bohemia and Moravia where they had highest support (elections won by broad anti-communist coalition called Civic Forum that soon disintegrated)
- “success” in 1992 elections when SZ teamed up with Agrarians and Socialists but then two thirds of Greens left over the coalition agreement
- 1996, SZ in such disarray that did not even participate in national elections (which led to a stabilization of sorts of the political landscape, with Civic and Social Democrats emerging as the two large parties – about 30% each) and Christian Democrats and Communists having about 10 percent of the votes each ... [I know it does not add up to 100 %]
- 2001, SZ down to 239 members, most of them older, with little formal education ... (stark contrast to the Greens in Germany who were strong-going at that point, and were running the country together with the Social Democrats)
- Factors that led to revival of Green party starting then:
 - series of corruption scandals involving ODS
 - Klaus (prime minister 1992 – 1997) openly dismissive of civil society and environmental movement. See his *Blue Planet in Green Shackles* pamphlet (2007, 100 pages)

Product Description (from Amazon)

The Competitive Enterprise Institute is proud to announce a provocative new book on environmental policy, *Blue Planet in Green Shackles* by Václav Klaus, President of the Czech Republic. President Klaus makes the case that policies being proposed to address global warming are not justified by current science and are, in fact, a dangerous threat to freedom and prosperity around the world. - -- Klaus argues that the environmental movement has transformed itself into an ideology that seeks to restrict human activities at any cost, while pursuing an impossible utopian dream of a perfectly "natural" world. The supposed threat of human civilization against a fragile Earth has become an article of faith, especially in the realm of global warming activism. --- "The largest threat to freedom, democracy, the market economy, and prosperity at the end of the 20th and at the beginning of the 21st century is no longer socialism," writes Klaus. "It is, instead, the ambitious, arrogant, unscrupulous ideology of environmentalism." --- The publication of *Blue Planet in Green Shackles - What is Endangered: Climate or Freedom?* continues the Competitive Enterprise Institute's history of fighting alarmist climate policies. CEI has long argued that whatever challenges future climate changes might bring, the worst possible response is to restrict human freedom and slow economic growth and innovation. --- "Today, the global warming debate raging in both the United States and Europe has become extremely contentious. On both sides of the Atlantic, the debate has metastasized into cultural warfare against economic liberty," writes CEI President Fred L. Smith, Jr. in the book's foreword. "For that reason, pro-freedom voices are needed to reframe the debate to show how a free people can better address the challenges facing Western civilization. To that end, we are proud to publish *Blue Planet in Green Shackles*."

- non-parliamentary protests over the Temelin Nuclear Power Plant and other issues (such as corruption and civil society) failed
- CSSD formed minority government with ODS tacit approval; perception that that was too much collusion on the part of the large parties
- "While SZ was small, dysfunctional, and heavily indebted, it did have an existing organizational structure, a well-known name, and ties to a European party" (p. 816)
- Revitalization was initiated by outsiders Jan Beranek and Peter Stepanek (see p. 816)
- 2002, promising election results on national level (2%), with particularly good showing in urban centers such as Prague and Brno among younger, well-educated urban voters (similar to Greens in Germany)

- 2003, Beranek joined the Greens, and together with Jakub Patočka started to rewrite programme and constitution of the Greens (programmatically he stressed similarity to German Greens, organizationally he centralized power)
- 2004, crisis over the June 2004 European elections list, headed by Patočka; critique headed by Petr Uhl, “a prominent dissident from the communist era and former Commissioner for Human Rights. Uhl wanted the list headed by former Minister of Environment Martin Bursík, what that time was not even a SZ member (having joined KDU several years earlier). While Uhl held no leadership position, he had close ties to Daniel Cohn-Bendit, then co-President of the European Green Party and self-proclaimed ‘realo’. Cohn-Bendit demanded that Beranek redo the list and rewrite the party constitution, which he refused to do. The Greens still won 3.2 %, ... , but inside the party the results were viewed as a disaster in light of expectations, setting in motion the autumn 2004 leadership battle. By summer 2004, there was a growing faction wanting to replace Beranek with the more media savvy and pragmatic Bursík. This faction was led by Štěpánek, who had since joined the party and had long-standing ties to both Uhl and Bursík. The group also complained of the leadership’s undemocratic behavior, calling for restoring the power to the regional organizations. ... the party became a cauldron of intense personal rivalries ... ” (p. 817)
- 2005, Bursík becomes chair of SZ, several of Beranek’s opponents won leadership positions (including Štěpánek), Beranek and his group eventually were ousted from the party
- 2006, after campaigning on quality of life (e.g., increased preservation of green space, reduced weekend truck traffic), good governance, greater rights for women and minorities, increased use of renewable energies, preservation of community control over schools, the Greens (also benefiting from the collapse of the liberal US-DEU)
 - win 6.3 % of the popular vote (underperforming expectations significantly)
 - becomes (after bargaining that lasted from June to December) “the surprise kingmaker” (p. 815) of the centre-right government that was voted out of office March 24, 2009. The reward: Bursík becomes Deputy Prime Minister as well as minister of the Environment, Greens also are appointed as Ministers of Education and Minister of Equal Opportunity, and Greens nominate Karel Schwarzenberg as Minister of Foreign Affairs; they also secured agreement that there would be no expansion of nuclear power, more emphasis on renewable energy and energy efficiency, a tax for major CO₂ polluters, as well as concessions in transportation, anti-corruption, and minority protection policies.
 - gets caught quickly in new round of internal arguments about things such as the US missile shield against ‘rogue states’ as well as factional battles

within the party (leading to Stepanek not being reelected to the SZ leadership in February 2007, to Stropnický – one of Bursík's most vocal critics – being elected deputy chair of the SZ's national council in May 2007, to Kuchtová being forced to resign as Minister of Education in October 2007, to Liska being appointed new Minister of Education a few weeks later after internal debate about the procedure leading to appointment, ...). These debates reflect personal animosities and long-term concerns about the identity of the party and differences about the appropriate degree of centralization and pragmatism.

- January 31, 2009: Democratic Appeal faction within SZ initiated by Kuchová, Zubová, and others critical of Bursík's leadership.
- March 12, 2009: Democratic Green Party (DSZ), founded by dissatisfied members of the Green Party (but not, yet, members of the SZ's internal faction Democratic Appeal – such as Kuchtová and Zubová – who were expelled from the SZ a couple of days earlier).

A green change of heart

Olga Zubová is outspoken in her critique of her own party and the current government

By [Benjamin Thomas Cunningham](#) , bcunningham@praguepost.com

Staff Writer, *The Prague Post*

November 5th, 2008 issue

Among the people at the center of a struggle within the present governing coalition and the Green Party is **Olga Zubová**, a deputy from Kutná Hora. She first came to national attention when she controversially missed voting in presidential elections earlier this year. More recently, her name was in the headlines tied to an attempted blackmail scheme by deposed ODS Deputy Jan Morava. Now **she is among an outspoken group within her own party opposing the leadership of party Chairman Martin Bursík**. She spoke to with The Prague Post Oct. 31 at Parliament. On Nov. 3 **she announced her intention to resign as chairwoman of the Green Party National Council after the party's poor showing in regional elections based on a platform promoted by Bursík**. "The voters didn't accept it, but the party's leadership hasn't responded to that," she says.

<snip>

TPP: You were caught up in this **Jan Morava affair**, where there was actually an attempt to acquire pictures of your daughter for future use in a blackmail scam. How did that make you feel? What does it say about the state of Czech politics?

OZ: Of course, firstly I was shocked that something like that actually happens on the political scene. I automatically trusted him, and I did not suspect him in any way. I don't know why it was me [chosen as a target by Morava], but I think it was because there were a few times when I did not vote as the coalition did, and I assumed the position of a person who has his or her own opinion. And, of course, it is not only about Morava himself, the thing is that he offers materials to people and they don't automatically reject them. [According to media reports,] Deputy Petr Tluchoř [of the ODS] was asking whether it comes as a series [of photos] or if it's just one [photo]. So the media gave me the impression that this is a common practice on the political scene, which is inconceivable to me. Another thing that surprised me was the unwillingness of politicians to deal with the issue.

TPP: Do you think other, more-senior people were behind this scandal?

OZ: It is possible. I don't know, but, of course, this does not justify him. My feeling is that he, as a young 28-year-old deputy, wanted to become a part of the adult group. His value was based on the fact that he was able to get information. He said that himself. Czech politics, from my perspective, is really vulgar, and there is an atmosphere of distrust and unfriendliness. In such an environment, you can only trust yourself.

TPP: You chose to abstain from the **no-confidence vote on Prime Minister Topolánek and the current government**. Ninety-seven people voted against the government, and it would have taken 101 votes to topple the government. You and a few other people could have changed things. Why didn't you vote?

OZ: For my part, it was to give a signal to this government that voters no longer trust it and that the government should realize this. I said that in a speech I gave, and I said that I did not want to agree with the opposition, and I don't want to help the government to fall whenever the opposition sets its mind to do so. But, because of the reasons I have already mentioned [namely the Morava case], and because of [the atmosphere] in the Chamber of Deputies, it seems impossible that the government does not take a stand on any of these issues, but so far it hasn't taken any stand. So that was one reason and then, of course, the [loss in the recent regional elections]. So these two reasons: the atmosphere in the Chamber of Deputies and the elections. It was a message from me to the government that it cannot have my confidence at all costs. I did not want the government to fall. You have to think ahead.

<snip>

TPP: Our information is that **you have some strong disagreements with Bursík both on policy and his leadership style**. Why is he still the party leader?

OZ: You have good information. Unfortunately, he is still the chairman, because there were more votes for him. I don't want to go into detail about this, because it is really complicated.

TPP: Our information also says that party membership is up 300 percent since June, and that Bursík guaranteed himself re-election as party head by securing votes from new party members. Is that correct?

OZ: You're talking about the chapters. It is true that before the [party] congress, around 57 of these chapters/organizations were formed. According to the code of rules for our party, it is possible to send a delegate [to attend the congress and vote] if the organization has at least three members. According to the 1:8 rule, each organization sends one delegate even if it does not have eight members. For example, one three-member organization sends a delegate to the congress and an organization that has 32 members can send four delegates. Another example: One existing 30-member organization sends three delegates and 10 new three-member organizations send 10 delegates. They broke up the larger organizations into smaller ones. It was pure math. This doesn't mean that Bursík's vision and opinions won; it was just a mathematical victory.

TPP: So Bursík and his people made this happen?

OZ: Yes, they really prepared for the congress. They knew it was going to take place, whereas others did not. Then Bursík presented his concept of undivided leadership of the party, and the whole congress was about replacing three people in the leadership. Now it is single-vision leadership. So people like [former Education Minister Dana] Kuchtová are no longer in the leadership. But they are still in the Green Party; these people haven't disappeared. It all started with disagreements on political issues, but it lapsed to a personal level. For example, we didn't think it was right that [Bursík] gave Dana Kuchtová a "yellow card," that he did not back her, and it escalated from there. In terms of opinions, Bursík strays from the Green Party agenda, and it is probably because of our presence in the government. The U.S. radar base, transport, health care, foreign policy. These are areas where we have given in, and the Greens don't like that. Then it is the basic issue that we should be a left-leaning party, but we are in a coalition with a right-leaning government. We have entered into a coalition agreement, and there is the government policy statement. We agreed with that regardless of the opposing forces within the party. The Greens have a problem with issues and areas that go beyond the framework of the existing Government Policy Statement.

<snip>

- March 24, 2009: ... (no-confidence vote, Kuchtova is vote no. 101)
... according to current polls, the Greens are not likely to make it into the next parliament

... surveys suggest that since 2006 elections Greens have lost more than half of their supporters: is it because the Greens are neither Green nor democratic? And what does that mean anyways?